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Since it was first identified, the epidemic scale of the recently emerged novel
coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Wuhan, China, has increased rapidly, with cases
arising across China and other countries and regions. Using a transmission
model, we estimate a basic reproductive number of 3.11 (95% CI, 2.39–4.13),
indicating that 58–76% of transmissions must be prevented to stop increas-
ing. We also estimate a case ascertainment rate in Wuhan of 5.0% (95% CI,
3.6–7.4). The true size of the epidemic may be significantly greater than
the published case counts suggest, with our model estimating 21 022 (pre-
diction interval, 11 090–33 490) total infections in Wuhan between 1 and 22
January. We discuss our findings in the light of more recent information.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.
1. Introduction
A novel betacoronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) [1] was first identified from a cluster of
atypical pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, on 31 December
2019. Most initial cases had epidemiological links with a live animal market,
suggesting a possible zoonotic origin [2]. Over the following six weeks, cases
spread to other Chinese provinces. As of 17 February 2020, 09.00 GMT, there
are over 50 000 confirmed cases—the majority in mainland China—and more
than 600 cases reported in 25 other countries [3]. Infections in family clusters
[4,5] and in healthcareworkers confirm the occurrence of human-to-human trans-
mission. Furthermore, recent case clusters in Germany [6], France [7] and on a
cruise ship in Japan [2] suggest that SARS-CoV-2 is highly transmissible. Emer-
ging data suggest that coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) causes a spectrum
of clinical severity, frommild upper respiratory tract illness to severe pneumonia,
with a small proportion developing acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),
septic shock, multi-organ failure and death [4,5,8,9]. However, the proportion of
those infected that have mild symptoms and do not seek medical care is unclear,
since surveillance is likely biased towards severe disease.
Wuhan is a city of more than 11 million residents and is connected to other
cities in China via high-speed railway and frequent commercial airline flights.
There were 670 417 airline passenger bookings departing Wuhan made
during January 2017, the top destinations being Shanghai (53 214 bookings),
Beijing (51 066 bookings) and Kunming (40 120 bookings) [10] (figure 1).
While the majority of air travel departing Wuhan is domestic (87.2% of book-
ings, January 2017), Wuhan is connected internationally through both direct
and indirect flights [11]. The outbreak comes at a time when there is a substan-






















Figure 1. Connectivity of Wuhan to other cities and provinces in mainland China, based on total commercial airline traffic from Wuhan in January 2017. Traffic is






































Lunar New Year on 25 January 2019. Over 3 billion passenger
journeys were predicted for the period between 10 January
and 18 February [12]. In an effort to contain the outbreak,
travel restrictions were imposed in Wuhan from 23 January,
and have since expanded to 12 other cities, and large social
gatherings cancelled [13].
Here, we fitted a mathematical model of transmission
withinWuhan and other Chinese cities to early reported num-
bers of confirmed cases within cities in China and in other
countries or regions. We inferred the rate of underreporting
in Wuhan to estimate the possible size of the outbreak in
Wuhan, as well as key epidemiological parameters including
the basic reproductive ratio and infectious period.2. Methods
(a) Transmission model
We fitted a deterministic SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-
Removed) metapopulation transmission model of infection within
and betweenmajor Chinese cities to the daily number of confirmed
cases of COVID-19 in Chinese cities and cases reported in other
countries/regions, using an assumption of Poisson-distributed
daily case counts. We modelled the period from 1 January 2020,
when local authorities closed thewetmarket implicated as the zoo-
notic source of human infection [14], up to and including 22 January
2020. We only considered human-to-human transmission in our
model and made the assumption that following the closure of the
market on 1 January, no further zoonotic infection contributed to
epidemic dynamics. Further description of the mathematical
model can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
We modelled transmission of infection between cities in China
using daily-adjusted rates of travel estimated frommonthly aggre-
gated full itinerary passenger booking data for January 2017,
accessed from OAG Traffic Analyser database [10]. We also mod-
elled the expected importation of infection into other countriesor regions outside of mainland China, using the same data. We
made the assumption that travellers are drawn randomly from
the origin population, and, therefore, the prevalence of infection
among travellers is the same as the prevalence in the population
travellers are starting from.
We estimated the transmission rate and the removal rate (the
inverse of the effective infectious period) through fitting the
model to daily case numbers reported within the modelled
cities in China and reported by other countries/regions. We
assumed that the latent period was 4 days, based on an estimate
of the incubation period of SARS, a related coronavirus [15]. This
is similar to the estimate of 4.4 days from the initial characteriz-
ation of COVID-19 cases. We made the assumption that the latent
period approximates to the incubation period. We also estimated
the case ascertainment ratio (CAR) within Wuhan, and the initial
number of human infections present in Wuhan when the market
was closed. We assumed that the case ascertainment is 100% in
other cities in China, as well as in other countries/regions; we
note that this assumption may be an overestimate of the CAR
in other locations [16].
(b) Parameter estimation
Daily numbers of newly confirmed cases in Chinese cities and
other countries/regions reported up to and including 22 January
2020 were used for fitting; data were collated from public reports.
For model validation, we compared model out-of-sample predic-
tions for the period 23–29 January, using data collated in the
same way. From 23 January, cases for Wuhan and other locations
within Hubei were only reported at the aggregate province level.
Fitting was achieved by treating the ordinary differential
equations (ODE) system as representing the mean number of
new cases per day in our study period, and assuming that the
observed number of new cases was (approx.) Poisson distributed
around this mean. Given the model and data, parameter infer-
ence was achieved by maximum-likelihood estimation using
the Nelder–Mead optimization as implemented in the optim()
















































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2. Sensitivity of parameter estimates to the assumed latent period (1/α) value. Boxes represent the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles and black dots the 50%






































com/chrism0dwk/wuhan/tree/v0.3 for R code, case data and
prepared datafiles).
Uncertainty in the parameter estimates was explored using
parametric bootstrap according to the following procedure. Firstly,
10 000Monte Carlo simulations from themodel (ODE and Poisson
noise) were generated using the maximum likelihood estimates of
the parameters. Each simulated dataset was then re-fitted to the
model to construct a joint sampling distribution of the parameters,
and 95% confidence estimated as the lower 2.5% and upper 97.5%
quantiles. The ODE system (without Poisson noise) was run over
this sampling distribution to generate 95% confidence intervals
around the predicted mean epidemic trajectory.0265(c) Doubling time calculation
We calculate the doubling time of an epidemic using the
observed cumulative epidemic size, q, at two time points, t1
and t2. The epidemic doubling time, Td, is given by





(a) Epidemiological parameter estimates
We estimated the transmission ratewithinWuhan, β, to be 1.94
days−1 (95% CI, 1.25–6.71), while we found the infectious
period to be 1.61 days (95% CI, 0.35–3.23). We calculated the
basic reproductive number, R0, of the infection to be 3.11
(95% CI, 2.39–4.13), comparable to the range for SARS esti-
mated from outbreaks during the 2003 epidemic [18,19], as
well as other early estimates for COVID-19 [20–24]. We high-
light that this number is highly uncertain and that a large
range of parameters are consistent with the data given the
assumptions of our model. This estimate reflects both the
dynamics of transmission and, potentially, the dynamics of
case reporting, where increases in reporting rate over time
could potentially inflate our estimate. This estimate of R0 is sig-
nificantly greater than 1, the epidemic threshold, suggesting a
concerted effort is required to control the outbreak, requiring
between 58% and 76% of transmission to be averted to control
the epidemic.
We estimated that the average CAR in Wuhan between 1
and 22 January was 5.0% (95% CI, 3.6%–7.4%), reflecting the
difficulty in identifying cases of a novel pathogen. Given the
generally good level of access to healthcare in China, this also
suggests that the majority of infections may be of mild illness
and insufficiently serious for individuals to seek treatment.
However, it is worth noting that a number of identified
cases have died [25] and that uncertainty in the case fatality
ratio remains. Also, asymptomatic infection has been
reported for COVID-19 [4]. Finally, we also estimated thesize of the epidemic in Wuhan at the time of the market
closure (1 January) to be 15 individuals (95% CI, 5–37).
Our estimates of epidemiological parameters are sensitive
to our assumption regarding the length of the latent period
(figure 2). Early epidemiological investigations suggest a dur-
ation between 3 and 6 days [4]; should the latent period be
longer than the 4 days we assume, our R0 estimates would be
higher and the estimated CAR slightly lower (figure 2). If
cases were reported with increasing efficiency or the timing
of cases is inconsistent with the timing assumed here (i.e.
throughout the outbreak, the length of time between infection
and reporting in surveillance data is declining), this may tend
to decrease our estimate of the reproductive number.
(b) Epidemic size estimates
Using our parametrized transmission model, we simulated the
impact of an ongoing outbreak in Wuhan to seed infections
and outbreaks in other cities of China, and to generate infection
in travellers to other countries/regions, through airline travel
originating in China. We stress that these projections make
strong assumptions: that no control interventions are insti-
gated; that the key epidemiological variables driving
epidemic dynamics remain constant; that travel behaviour
within China and to other countries/regions continues as per
our mobility estimates; finally, we only consider travel by air
and do not include land transportation, particularly via the
rail network within China.
We estimated that on 22 January, in Wuhan, there were
currently 14 464 infected individuals (prediction interval,
6510–25 095), and a total 21 022 infections (prediction interval,
11 090–33 490) since the start of the year.We also estimate there
were 24 currently infected individuals (prediction interval,
19–30) in other locations of China on this date. For comparative
purposes, we estimate the total number of infections inWuhan
from 1 January to 18 January inclusive to have been 6733
(prediction interval, 3500–10 914). This estimate of the total
infections is comparable to other published estimates based
on travel data and reported cases identified outside of China
(estimated between 1700 and 7800) [26], and highlights our
estimated low CAR, the rapid growth of the epidemic and
uncertainty in model predictions.
From 23 January, large-scale movement restrictions were
implemented in Wuhan and across Hubei province in an
effort to contain the spread of the virus. For the period 23–29
January, our model underestimated the growth of epidemics
within Hubei and other Chinese cities (figure 3b–e), while
our predictions for exportations to other countries/regions
were reasonable (figure 4). While this could reflect an increase
in the transmission rate, it may also be due to accelerated case
detection, an increase in testing capacity, changes in case


























































































































































































































Figure 3. (a) Comparison of observed cases and predicted cumulative confirmed cases in Wuhan for the period 1–24 January. Out-of-scope epidemic predictions of
cumulative confirmed cases for (b) Hubei, (c) Beijing, (d ) Guangzhou and (e) Shanghai up to 29 January. Grey region denotes the prediction period; 95% confidence


































































































































































































































































































































































(e) ( f )
(d)
(g) (h)
Figure 4. Out-of-scope predictions of cumulative confirmed cases in selected countries/regions up to 29 January. Grey region denotes the prediction period;
95% confidence intervals around the mean epidemic trajectories are denoted by coloured areas. (a) Hong Kong SAR, (b) Japan, (c) Malaysia, (d) Singapore,






































Our model predicts that on 29 January, the epidemic in
Wuhan will be substantially larger, with 594 cases expected to
be detected on that day in Wuhan (prediction interval, 446–
788) and 105 077 currently infected (prediction interval,
46 635–185 412) (figure 3 and table 1). If transmission has
reduced, either through control or spontaneous public response
to the epidemic, this will be a gross overestimate, though it may
be useful to help gauge the effectiveness of interventions.
Themodel predicts infected travellers to other Chinese cities
will initiate outbreaks in those cities, the largest on 29 January
being in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu
and Kunming (figure 3 and table 1). Our model predicts the
total number of infected individuals in locations elsewhere in
China to be 237 (prediction interval, 167–324) on 29 January.
Finally, the model predicts an elevated risk of importations
into other countries/regions, most notably to Thailand, Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, USA, Singapore,
Malaysia, Australia and Viet Nam (figure 3 and table 1).Again, these predictions assume no change in the transmission
of the virus within China through control or other responses to
the epidemic, and likely underestimate the potential importa-
tion rate to regions with ground transportation from China,
in particular Hong Kong.4. Comparison of estimates to other reports
Our estimates of R0 are broadly consistent with early estimates
from other groups: 2.5 (95% CI 2.2–2.9) for peer-reviewed
studies and 3.6 for pre-prints (95% CI 2.7–4.5) [27]; 2.6 (uncer-
tainty range 1.5–3.5) [28]; 2.92 (95%CI 2.28, 3.67) [29]; 2.2 (90%
interval: 1.4–3.8) [30]. Sources of discrepancies may be due to
model differences and differences in the contribution of
specific types of data to our estimates. We believe that our esti-
mates are slightly elevated compared to others due to the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































than Wuhan. However, it is important to note that our point
estimate is consistent with all others’ uncertainty intervals,
all indicating sustained growth of cases. lsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:202002655. Comparison of transmissibility with SARS
and MERS
Our estimates of the basic reproductive number for this novel
coronavirus are comparable to most estimates reported for
SARS and MERS-CoV, but similar to some estimates from
subsets of data in the early period of SARS. For the SARS cor-
onavirus, estimates of the mean reproductive number ranged
from 1.1 to 4.2 with most estimates between 2 and 3 [31].
These estimates represent a range of methods and settings.
Some estimates come from data that mix time periods
before and after control. Estimates of R0 also varied based
on assumed serial intervals (e.g. [18] estimated R0 ranging
from 2.2 to 3.6 for serial intervals of 8–12 days). Another
study [31] reviewed sources of variation in basic reproductive
numbers of SARS and noted that in those locations in which
outbreaks occurred, R0 was approximately 3. Estimates from
MERS-CoV were uniformly lower, with estimates from Saudi
Arabia having a mean of less than 1 (approx. 0.5) but exhib-
ited large temporal variability with increases in some periods
of time, particularly in healthcare settings [32].
A comparison of the efficiency of transmission in this out-
break and in SARS outbreaks can be seen as well in simple
comparisons of doubling times in each outbreak. In SARS, dou-
bling times varied from 4.6 to 14.2 days depending on setting:
doubling time, Td = 6.0 (1358 over 63 days, Singapore), Td = 4.6
(425 over 41 days, Hong Kong), Td = 14.2 (7919 over 185 days,
overall) [18]. Using confirmed case information (41 reported 14
January; 291 reported 24.00 on 20 January; 1975 reported 24.00
on 25 January) [33], we find doubling times of 2.1, 1.8 and 2.0
days. If the outbreak has been ongoing for a longer period of
time, this would increase the estimated doubling time. These
doubling time estimates, similar to our estimates of R0, are sus-
ceptible to bias due to the dynamics of case reporting, with
bunching of identified cases (due to temporally clustered rec-
ognition of cases) tending to bias our estimate towards lower
doubling times. We note our estimates of the doubling time
in this outbreak are short compared to estimates from the
SARS outbreak in Hong Kong [18].6. Limitations
Our model necessarily makes a number of assumptions. Our
estimates of the basic reproductive number of this novel corona-
virus are tied to the specific time period and data analysed here,
and this measure may change substantially over the course of
this outbreak and as additional data arrive. Additionally, the
spatial component of our model is dependent upon only airline
travel; the model does not include rail and road transportation,
so we may underestimate local connectivity and the connec-
tivity of Wuhan to other locations. We also do not attempt to
account for any implementation of control, nor any dynamic
changes of factors that may influence transmission (such as
spontaneous social distancing), nor changes in surveillance
and reporting effort. Our choice of modelling approach may
also lead to unreliability in the precision of our estimated
model transmission parameters [34]. However, our approach
used ‘raw’ counts of cases to fit the model, not cumulativecase information, and as such, our point estimates would not
be biased [34]. Finally, we made a pragmatic assumption that
all infections in Chinese cities excluding Wuhan and in inter-
national destinations were identified (CAR is 100%).
Significant prevalence of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic
infections (particularly where border screening of travellers
relies on symptomatic detection) would mean the number of
cases outside of Wuhan and in other countries we use for
model fitting are underestimates, resulting in an underestimate
of the inter-city and international transmission rate. Thismay be
partially offset by non-Wuhan locations generating their own
cases (inflating the number of infections relative to what we
would expect if Wuhan were the only case generator). Our
transmission rate estimates would be robust if the ratio of
asymptomatic infection to symptomatic of these occult infec-
tions were unbiased (e.g. occult infection prevalence was
identical in Guangzhou, Beijing and among international
travellers) and there was uniform diagnostic ability.
Earlier novel coronavirus (SARS andMERS-CoV) outbreaks
found evidence for substantial heterogeneity in reproductive
numbers between individuals [31,32,35]. In our analysis, we
assume that there is little heterogeneity in reproductive
numbers and this assumptionmay change our estimated repro-
ductive number. Additionally, R0 estimates tend to be reduced
as case information accumulates, though control measures may
also be introduced during these periods. As is true for anymod-
elling analysis of surveillance data, our estimate of R0 may also
reflect the dynamics of surveillance effort and reporting rather
than just the dynamics of the epidemic.
A key uncertainty of this outbreak is when it started. We
have chosen to model transmission from 1 January onwards.
Surveillance in China and elsewhere only started once the
outbreak was identified in Wuhan. Had the outbreak started
much earlier, and both within China and international infec-
tious exports occurred before January and in early January
(while surveillance was ramping up), our estimates of the
reproductive number would mostly decrease.
A threat to the accuracy of these projections is if a sub-
stantial proportion of infection has been due to multiple
exposures to animals that have been curtailed in some way.
These data may also represent a period of high transmission
(due to favourable seasonal conditions, stochastic variation or
selection bias in detecting large clusters of transmission) that
will not be sustained over long periods of time.
7. Summary
We are still in the early days of this outbreak and there is much
uncertainty in both the scale of the outbreak and key epidemio-
logical information regarding transmission. However, the
rapidity of the growth of cases since the recognition of the out-
break is much greater than that observed in outbreaks of either
SARS orMERS-CoV. This is consistent with our broadly higher
estimates of the reproductive number for this outbreak com-
pared to these other emergent coronaviruses, suggesting that
containment or control of this pathogen may be substantially
more difficult.
8. In context
This work was conducted, written and uploaded to an open-
access preprint repository in January 2020; figures 3 and 4






































such, it provided early estimates of important epidemiological
characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 and contributed to the evidence
that the novel coronavirus had pandemic potential. Here, we
reflect on our modelling approach and the findings of the
research in the light of the considerable research conducted
on SARS-CoV-2 since.
(a) Methodological approach
The modelling approach and inference methodology used
in this study was necessarily simple: ODE are quick to
implement, with the formulation of the likelihood as Poisson
distributed noise around the ODE system being a pragmatic
way of accounting for stochastic variation in daily case detec-
tions. Many approaches to modelling SARS-CoV-2 have
continued with these assumptions. However, even though
case reporting will be subject to measurement error, this
approach ignores the fact that epidemics are intrinsically
stochastic—the ODE approach does not allow for stochastic
jumps in the mean epidemic trajectory. This is particularly
problematic for models trained on datasets with low numbers
of cases, where stochastic variation in the epidemic process
dominates the overall epidemic dynamics. In such cases,
the variation in the case time series will be attributed to the
overdispersion, leading to non-identifiability of the model
parameters of interest. Work on statistical inference methods
for stochastic methodology is an ongoing topic of research,
and is a much needed area of future methodological develop-
ment to ensure that rapid, accurate and fine-scale calibration
of complex models is feasible in the event of an outbreak.
(b) Assumptions regarding pathogen epidemiology
Transmission modelling conducted during the early stages of
any outbreak of a novel pathogen necessarily makes a
number of strong assumptions regarding the epidemiology
of the pathogen, and there are several in this work which
may now be reassessed in the light of more recent studies. A
key assumption made was the length of the latent period. In
January 2020, no epidemiological studies from China had
been published that described this interval. Through analogy,
we assumed a similar distribution to that observed as the incu-
bation period for the related virus, MERS-CoV. A study
published in March 2020 found the incubation period for
SARS-CoV-2 in early Wuhan cases was 5.2 days (95% CI,
4.1–7.0) [22], while Linton et al. [36] estimated the incubation
period to be between 3.5 and 5.7 days (they present a range
of estimates using different methods). Further, Lauer et al.
[37] estimated the period as 5.1 days (95% CI, 4.5–5.8).
By modelling the SEIR infection states as susceptible, latent
(infected but not infectious), infectious (whether symptomatic or
not) and identified/removed, we effectively incorporated pre-
symptomatic transmission and avoided issues around asympto-
matic infection, though we did assume that pre-symptomatic
and post-symptomatic infected individuals were equally infec-
tious. We also made a strong assumption that case reporting
was consistent during the modelled time period. Tsang et al.
[38] have shown that as the case definition was relaxed (as
knowledge accumulated during the early stages of the Wuhan
outbreak), a greater number of cases were reported, which
could confound estimates of epidemic growth.
(c) Effective infectious period
Unusually for a transmissionmodel,wewere able to jointly esti-
mate both transmission rate and effective infectious period—weattribute this to the constraints imposed by fitting to the spatial–
temporal case data. Our estimate of 1.61 days (95% CI, 0.35–
3.23) is relatively short compared to the known duration of
viral shedding, where the live virus has been isolated from
patients up to 9 days since illness onset [39], and compared to
one epidemiological study of Chinese cases which estimated
the mean infectious period to be 14 days (IQR 11–17.5 days)
[40]. Our estimate for the effective infectious period also accounts
for the effect of treatment or isolation on the period for which
individuals may infect others. However, estimates of symptom
onset to admission inWuhan during the modelled period were
in the range of 8–14 days [41], suggesting that self-isolation
following the onset of illness may have been common.
(d) Basic reproduction number
Despite the limitations of our approach, in particular the
reliance on publicly reported case data, our estimated basic
reproduction number for Wuhan compares favourably with
estimates for a similar time or in the following months. A
study using a similar transmission modelling framework to
the one presented here [42] estimated R0 to be 2.7 (95% CrI,
2.5–2.9). Li et al. [22] reported R0 of 2.2 (95% CI, 1.4–3.9) for
Wuhan using data from the same period as our study. A
review [43] of early reproduction number estimates based
on COVID-19 cases from Wuhan and other locations found
estimates to range between 1.9 and 6.5, with the majority
between 2.0 and 3.0. Another review [44] found a pooled
estimate of R0 to be 3.0 (95% CI, 2.7–3.4).
(e) Reflective summary
Our paper demonstrates the utility of relatively simple trans-
mission models for providing a rapid quantitative
assessment of disease transmission risk and pandemic poten-
tial, given early reports of case incidence of a novel pathogen.
Such information may be used to justify the implementation
of border disease screening programmes, which may be tar-
geted towards high-risk international transport routes.
Despite the reliance on aggregated, publicly reported data,
and invoking key assumptions about the natural history of
the disease (notably the latent period) albeit informed by that
of a closely related virus, our approach provided reasonable
estimates of both the basic reproduction number and the
likely true scale of the epidemic at the pandemic source. This
highlights the usefulness of relatively simplemodels to capture
salient features of an epidemic, despite not incorporating
elements now known to be important, such as differential
disease severity by age and asymptomatic infection.
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